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My case is illustrated below. All comments are appreciated, or if you can help me on contingency, please e-mail me at stclair43@yahoo.com, or click at:


The Gist of the Case "

Around 1/15/2000 Defendant Seller promised to pay Aguilar a commission to find a buyer for a 56 unit motel he occupied at the time. Around 2/20/2000 aguilar found Defendant Buyer on 3/4/00 Aguilar wrote & presented a full price offer to Defendant Seller. On 3/14/00 Defendant Seller wrote and faxed to Aguilar a counter offer, memorializing agreement to pay broker a commission. Thereafter Defendant Seller and the Defendant Buyers got together and negotiated a purchased price that excluded Aguilar's commission. If you have read Torelli v. J.P. and Buckaloo v. Johnson then you have read my case


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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiff complains and for causes of action alleges as follows: Plaitiff, Teresa Aguilar, is now and at all times mentioned in this complaint was, a resident of Los Angeles County, California

Defendant Seller, Defendant Escrow, Defendant Buyer, are now, and at all times mentioned in this complaint were, individuals residing in Los Angeles County, California.

Plaintiff does not know the true names of defendants DOES 1 through 25, and therefore sues them by those fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on the basis of that information and belief alleges, that each of those defendants was in some manner legally responsible for the events and happenings alleged in this complaint and for plaintiff's damages. The names, capacities and relationships of DOES 1 through 25 will be alleged by amendment to this complaint when they are known.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times mentioned in this complaint, defendants were the agents and employees of their codefendants, and in doing the things alleged in this complaint were acting within the course and scope of that agency and employment.

Real estate broker Teresa Aguilar (Plaintiff) was denied her commission due and owing on the sale of a 56 unit motel located at 1111 Vine Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90038. Thus, she brings this action against defendants, the sellers and the buyers of the property and/or their assignees, Defendant Escrow, XXX Kao, and Does 1 through 20. Plaintiff's principal claims are that the acts of defendants constituted the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, discrimination, conspiracy and damages.

The facts are as follows:Defendant Seller, acting individually and as agent for Defendants Wang, promised to pay Plaintiff 3% commission if she found a buyer for his property. Plaintiff interested the Defendant Buyer in the property, took him to see it, and discussed the attributes of the property as presented to her by Defendant Seller. The Plaintiff negotiated with Defendant Buyer for the purchase of the property, and as a result, Plaintiff wrote and submitted an offer of purchase dated March 4, 2000, (Exh.1). Defendant Seller, acting individually and as agent for Defendants Wang, accepted most all items including to pay commission to Plaintiff, but rejected in part some items, and executed a March 14, 2000, written counter offer that provided for the payment of a 6% commission to Plaintiff (Exh.2). Plaintiff presented the counter offer to Defendant Buyer the same day. On March 15, 2000, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Seller a letter registering her buyer "and/or assignees" as her clients (Exh.3). On April 22, 2000, Defendant Buyer answered and agreed to the March 14, 2000,Defendant Seller's counter offer, in whole but with 2 changes (Exh.4). Defendant Seller agreed to supply these changes but never did and instead submitted another counter offer. At this time, unknown to Plaintiff, the buyer and his assignees carried out negotiations directly with Defendant Seller and through third parties and submitted another offer on the property without going through plaintiff, but while they were still negotiating the first offer through Plaintiff and while they encouraged her to continue with her efforts; Plaintiff did so with the knowledge, approval, and encouragement of Defendant Seller and the Defendant Buyer. On April 7, 2000, Defendant Seller terminated Plaintiff's services without good cause, making Plaintiff's further performance impossible (Exh.5). As a result of Plaintiff efforts, Defendant Seller sold the property to Defendant Buyers, for basically the same terms as they had with Plaintiff but at a reduced selling price which excluded part of Plaintiff Aguilar's commission.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Conspiracy Against All Defendants)

Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 through 7 of this complaint.

On or around March 24, 2000, Defendants and each of them knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed among themselves to interfere with plaintiff's ability to successfully negotiate the purchase of the subject property. After Plaintiff found the defendant buyers the property they wanted, and after she found for defendant seller, buyers to purchase the property he wanted to sell, Defendants negotiated amongst themselves, while encouraging Plaintiff to continue with her efforts.

Defendant Seller was induced by Defendant Buyers not to consummate the sale through Plaintiff, therefore Plaintiff must recover damages from the defendants in a tort action for conspiracy.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Breach of Implied Contract and Intentional Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage Against All Defendants)

Plaintiff incorporates by these reference paragraphs 1 through 10 of this complaint.

Defendant Buyers contacted and dealt with the sellers Wang and Defendant Seller independently after having been shown the property by the Plaintiff, and with full knowledge of the existing agreement between Defendant Seller and Plaintiff as written on the counter offer dated March 14, 2000, thereon conspired to induce the breach of the existing agreement.

Thereafter, Defendant Seller agreed with Defendant Buyers to breach his agreement [Civ. Code §§ 3300-3318] and to defraud Plaintiff and knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the intent to not pay the plaintiff the commission. Civ. Code § 1710(4). Also, Defendant Escrow overtly acted in furtherance of the conspiracy to prevent and deprive Plaintiff of payment of her earned commission, by refusing to pay her at the close of escrow as demanded by Plaintiff in writing in May 22, 2000; the request for payment included a copy of the signed agreement to pay commission by Defendant Seller (Exh. 6). Defendants and each of them did the acts and things herein alleged pursuant to, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy and above-alleged agreement.

Defendants, furthered the conspiracy by cooperation with and lent aid and encouragement to one another ratified and adopted the acts of Does 1 through 20, defendants, they closed the transaction concealing from Plaintiff their agenda in that Defendant Seller terminated Plaintiff real estate services and asked her in writing 'not to talk to her buyer again' while her buyer, Defendant Buyer, hid from Plaintiff claiming to be out of town but sending his son XXX Patel to encourage Plaintiff to continue with her efforts, while the Defendant Buyers negotiated with Defendant Seller and others.

On March 15, 2000, Plaintiff registered Defendant Buyers and/or his assignees as her buyers with Defendant Seller. On or around March 16, 2000, Defendant Seller told Plaintiff that her buyer Defendant Buyers was contacting him directly and through others, and making other offers.

As a proximate result of the wrongful acts herein alleged and as a proximate result of defendants' acts complained of above, plaintiffs have suffered irreparable economic and emotional damages and she has been generally damaged in the sum of $132,000, the 6% commission of subject property's purchased price, plus interest, expenses and damages as listed below. Harper and James, Torts § 6.11, p. 510 (1956).

Defendants did the things herein alleged maliciously and to oppress, to defraud, and to coerce plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in the sum of $800,000. Civ. Code § 3333.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as set forth below. ///

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

For Fraud Against all Defendants, including

Defendant Seller (not fully litigated in previous claim)

Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 through 18 of this complaint.

On or about March 4, 2000, Defendant Buyer falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that he was the owner of the property located at 1111 Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90036; on or about March 22, 2000; Defendant Buyer falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that he had the balance of the deposit ready to open escrow and promised to give it to her but never did; later Defendant Buyer refused to talk to Plaintiff by phone or in person.

The representations made by defendant were in fact false. The true facts were: 1) The property located on Beverly Blvd., that Defendant Buyer claimed to own, when in fact the property ownership was under a ZZZ Patel and YYY Patel; 2) Defendant Buyer never intended to give Plaintiff the full deposit to open escrow, and in fact started to contact Defendant Seller directly and through third parties, making other offers but while sending his son XXX Patel to encourage Plaintiff to continue with her efforts; 3) Defendant Buyer while claiming to be out of town was in fact negotiating with Defendant Seller directly and through others but while having his son, XXX Patel, mislead Plaintiff.

Defendant Seller terminated Plaintiff real estate services demanding in writing that she not talk to her buyer again.

The true facts were that 1) although Defendant Seller denied ever telling Plaintiff, on March 18, 2000, that her buyer was sending others, he wrote on the April 7, 2000, "I only told you a Mexican Agent. ... [was being sent by Defendant Buyer]" (Exh. 5), admitting that he had made the statement; 2) Defendant Seller cut off Plaintiff name from purchase agreement in order to conceal the fact that he had even increased Plaintiff's commission from 3% to a 6%; 3) Defendant Seller demanded in writing when he terminated Plaintiff Real Estate services, that she "not talk to her buyer again" to discourage Plaintiff from following up any longer with the Defendant Buyer in order for the defendants to be free to collude.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants, by an act of fraud, caused Plaintiff not to received the agreed commission. Plaintiff also claims that as a result, she suffered money losses which the law calls damages. Plaintiff seeks to recover those damages in this proceeding. Promise made without the intent to perform it is actionable fraud

When the defendants made their representations they knew them to be false, and these representations were made by defendant with the intent to defraud and deceive the plaintiff and with the intent to induce plaintiff to act in the manner herein alleged, and at the time defendant made the promises to plaintiff, of signing counter offer dated March 22, 2000, to use her services as a real estate broker to this transaction, and to give her the deposit to open escrow, defendants had no intention of performing them.

Plaintiff, at the time these representations were made by defendants and at the time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants' representations and believed them to be true, further, Plaintiff, at the time these promises were made and at the time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of defendant's secret intention not to perform and plaintiff could not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered defendant's secret intention. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was induced to and did continue with her efforts with the negotiations. Had the plaintiff known the actual facts, she would not have taken such action to the detriment of other business prospects and if the plaintiff had known of the actual intention of defendants, plaintiff would not have taken such action. Plaintiff's reliance on defendant's representations was justified because they were constantly encouraging her to continue with her efforts in the negotiations. Calif.Civ.Code 3294(c)3(d).

As a proximate result of defendant's fraud and deceit and the facts herein alleged, plaintiff was economically and physically harmed by reason of which plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $360,000.

In doing the acts herein alleged, defendant acted with oppression, fraud, and malice, and plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in the sum of $500,000. Civ. Code § 3294.

The fraud claim against Defendant Seller in the previous trial was not fully and fairly litigated in an adversary hearing, and thus was not established due to the fact that the trial court dismissed the claim without due process and only due to procedural technicalities.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as set forth below.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

For Breach Of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing

Against All Defendants

Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 through 30 of this complaint.

California law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts between parties entered into in the State of California. The defendants named above in this cause of action, lack good faith by doing of their intentional acts, prevented the completion of the purchase by Plaintiff and the receipt of her commission. Defendants having frustrated by their own remissness the realization of the contractual objectives of Plaintiff, cannot take advantage of such conduct to efface the Real Estate Broker Plaintiff's right to her commission.

Defendant Buyer misrepresented the fact that he owned certain properties, to encourage Plaintiff to put her utmost efforts to have his offer accepted by Defendant Seller which led the plaintiff to rely on Defendant Buyer as a willing and able purchaser. Defendant Buyer promised to provide the deposit to open escrow but instead began to contact the seller Defendant Seller directly, and through others.

Defendant Buyer had knowledge of falsity or lack of reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the representation that he owned the property at 1111 Beverly Blvd. His intent to induce Plaintiff reliance and that actual and justifiable reliance by plaintiff resulted in damages.

As a result of the actions of defendants Defendant Seller, Wang, Defendant Buyers, Defendant Escrow, and Does 1 through 25 and each of them, set forth herein above, said defendants have violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against said Plaintiff herein, and as a result thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to damages as prayed.

The actions of said defendants, as herein before described in violation of said implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing have caused the Plaintiff to suffer damages in that she did not receive promised payment for her real estate services in the amount of $132,000.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment as set forth below.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Discrimination Against All Defendants)

Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 through 37 of this complaint.

Defendants subjected Plaintiff to gender and race discrimination, by exposing her to a hostile working environment in refusing in various occasions to come to the phone to talk to her and in claiming to be out of town, while on the other hand having others calling and encouraging her to continue with her efforts, thus the result of making her work, without intending to compensate her.

Defendant Seller demanded for Plaintiff to find him a buyer, and Defendant Buyer demanded for Plaintiff to find him a motel to purchase. They both demanded for Plaintiff to start the process, negotiate, and when the sale was close to consummation, they started to throw monkey wrenches on the transaction and brought a male agent to interfere, who was not even licensed in California at the time; further, these defendants hid, demanded termination of contacts, opened, and closed escrow behind Plaintiff's back with the aid of Defendant Escrow and Does 1 through 25. As a result of defendants' misconduct, Plaintiff was excluded from participation in her own transaction and her ability to make the sale was restricted on the basis of her gender and race.

The defendants "lied to, and gave false and misleading information" to Plaintiff who sought to help the seller sell his property, and buyer to purchase it.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against All Defendants)

Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 through 41 of this complaint.

The enticement, hide and seek actions as collected efforts by defendants were intentional and reckless infliction, by extreme and outrageous conduct, of severe emotional and mental distress caused to Plaintiff in that after constantly encouraging her to make great efforts to put the transaction together at their incessant insistence, the defendants' systematic pressuring to frustrate those same efforts that they promoted upon Plaintiff, was malicious and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause Plaintiff confusion and distress. The special relationship that existed between the parties justifies recovery. Defendants' conduct prevented Plaintiff from performing under her agreement with Defendant Seller and made Plaintiff's performance more burdensome and expensive. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in an amount that will compensate her for the financial loss resulting from the loss of the benefits of the contractual relationship and prospective economic advantage, for emotional distress or actual harm that resulted from the interference and disruption, and any other loss or harm caused by Defendants' malicious wrongdoing.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Retaliation Against Defendant Seller)

Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 through 43 of this complaint.

Retaliation was part of the decision to terminate Plaintiff real estate services and without legitimate reasons to do so. It was retaliation for Plaintiff reminding Defendant Seller as to the double commission liability payment if he signed another set of a purchase agreement with Plaintiff's buyers, the Defendant Buyers. Up to March 20, 2000, Defendant Seller was satisfied with Plaintiff performance to the point of increasing her commission from 3% to 6% as memorialized in counter offer dated March 14, 2000, (Exh. 2). As a result of Defendant Defendant Seller's actions, Plaintiff suffered retribution for warning Defendant Seller of liability for dealing directly with Plaintiff's buyers, therefore, Plaintiff must be compensated for retaliatory tactics suffered. Defendant Seller joined in the conspiracy in order to retaliate against her for forewarning him about the two commission liabilities, and should have known better than to take adverse action. The evidence support the punitive damages award based on the plaintiff's retaliation claim in the amount of $500,000.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendants and each of them, as follows:

1. For general damages in the sum of $860,000 -- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay;
2. For compensatory damages in the sum of $500,000 -- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay;
3. For punitive damages in the sum of $500,000 against each defendant;

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants as follows:

On the First Cause of Action:

1. For general damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

2. For special damages in an amount to be determined

-- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay.

On the Second Cause of Action:

1. For general damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

2. For special damages in an amount to be determined

-- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay.

On the Third Cause of Action:

1. For damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

2. For general damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

3. For special damages in an amount to be determined

-- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay.

On the Fourth Cause of Action:

1. For damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

2. For general damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

3. For special damages in an amount to be determined

-- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay.

On the Fifth Cause of Action:

1. For general damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

2. For special damages in an amount to be determined

-- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay.

On the Sixth Cause of Action:

1. For damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

2. For general damages in an amount not less than $500,000; and

3. For special damages in an amount to be determined

-- Plus responsibility to pay defendants' claims adjudged against all other Defendants if unable to pay.

On All Causes of Action:

1. For costs of suit incurred herein;

2. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper -- Plaintiff also expects all defendants to render surety if they cannot make surety for damages and penalties to be paid to Plaintiff.

A jury trial is demanded.

DATED: February 11, 2002

Respectfully submitted,

By: __________________________
Teresa Aguilar, Plaintiff pro se
VERIFICATION
I, Teresa Aguilar, am a Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at Long Beach, California.
DATED:
Teresa Aguilar, Plaintiff Pro se


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ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION
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CASE NO: BC268016

OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF TO DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT

MIKE CHANG MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF



Plaintiff TERESA AGUILAR hereby answers and opposes defendants MIKE CHANG, and/or all other defendants, et al., demurrer(s) to plaintiff's complaint. This action is essentially for damages of conspiracy, discrimination, interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, retaliation, and fraud case. Plaintiff's complaint entails matters to be decided by a resolution of the factual issues involved — and thus improper to resolve on demurrer.



Dated: April 8, 2002

By: ________________________________

Teresa Aguilar, Plaintiff pro se



MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRERS

I. INTRODUCTION

The complaint alleges that plaintiff Teresa Aguilar, a real estate broker, suffered damages as a result of the defendants acting in concert, using plaintiff's real estate services to their benefit and colluding to leave plaintiff out of her transaction, without compensation as promised even after defendants Defendant Seller and Defendant Buyers constantly encouraged her to continue with her efforts while the defendants schemed to finalize the transaction behind her back. After plaintiff complied with defendants' demands -- finding a buyer for Defendant Seller's property, and finding a property for Defendant Buyer and his assignees -- she was defrauded of her commission by defendants.

On March 15 and/or 18, 2002, Defendant Seller demurred to Plaintiff complaint on grounds alleging "all causes of action are barred by res judicata" and that "all causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and uncertainty."

A hearing has been set for April 17, 2002, at 8:30 A.M. in Department 44 of this Court, at the Los Angeles County Courthouse, located at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012.

II. ARGUMENT

A.

DEFENDANT HAS UNCLEAN HANDS AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO

RES JUDICATA AND CANNOT MEET HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendant Defendant Seller's intentional self-contradictions were used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage, and his inconsistent arguments and efforts to suppress evidence (See Attachments 1,2,3) are sufficient to invoke the unclean hands doctrine since these actions are clearly attributable to his intentional wrongdoing and to his efforts to conceal the facts [Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 497, 509-510, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 ].

In Michelson v. Camp (1999) 72 Cal. App. 4th 955, 959-961, 970-971, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 539 the court held that the defendant's deliberate inconsistencies are tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation and even fraud on court. Likewise, this claim cannot be barred by the prior judgment. The defense misrepresentations were knowing to defendant seller and to his counsel, Mr. Jones, and were made with the specific intent to cheat appellant out of due process and to defraud the court. Defendant Defendant Seller's testimony and Mr. Jones assertions were fraudulent in an effort to establish a meritless defense. Defendant Seller has "dirty hands," in the sense that he violated an interest of the plaintiff's. In November 2000, in Defendant Seller's deposition of Plaintiff, Defendant Seller's lawyer asked Plaintiff: "Did you ever tell Mr. Defendant Seller, "Look, why don't you just sell it for [$] 2.1 [million] and not give me all the extra money and I'll take my 3 percent?" (Attch 3), but, in court under oath, and other motions, Defendant Seller denied ever offering a commission to Plaintiff (Attch 2). This action alone supports the unclean hands doctrine, which does not entitle defendant seller to a res judicata affirmative defense. (See Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim Cite as: 96 C.D.O.S. 733.)

B.

COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY CLAIM PRECLUSION WHEN COMPLAINT INVOKES TWO DIFFERENT "PRIMARY RIGHTS" DEFENDANTS ARE THEREFORE NOT IN PRIVITY WITH DEFENDANT SELLER

Aguilar v. Defendant Seller action focused on the "breach of contract" of Defendant Seller's wrongdoing, while this present action of Aguilar v. Defendant Buyer ..., is directed to damages caused by interference of defendants Escrow and Defendant Buyer and other discriminatory issues illustrating that both cases invoked two different "primary rights," hence, the Defendant Buyers and Defendant Escrow interference are not in privity with Defendant Seller's breach. Environmental World Watch v. Cummins Engine (1999) Cal.App.2d. Aguilar v. Defendant Buyer litigation was not present in the Aguilar v. Defendant Seller action, since there are different damages for interference by the Defendant Buyers and Defendant Escrow as opposed to Defendant Seller's breaches; their discriminatory tactics where not adjudicated much less decided. The Interference and breach claims were against Defendant Seller not Defendant Buyer.

C.

ISSUE PRECLUSION ONLY PRECLUDES RELITIGATION OF ISSUES "ACTUALLY" LITIGATED AND DETERMINED IN THE PRIOR ACTION

The plaintiff's other causes of action — for damages of conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, retaliation, fraud by concealment of evidence, [Attach 1, 2] and by defendant's doctoring of binding documents [Attch 4], discrimination, interference against defendants Defendant Buyer and Defendant Escrow — are not barred by res judicata because these issues were not adjudicated, much less actually decided, in the prior action. In Taylor v. Hawkinson (1957) 47 Cal. 2d 893, 895-896, 306 P.2d 797 the court held that "... issue preclusion only precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior action.

D.

AS IMPORTANT AS IT IS THAT RES JUDICATA'S ASPECTS NOT BE UNDERCUT, IT IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAT INDIVIDUALS

NOT BE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS"

Issue Preclusion may be applied only if due process requirements are satisfied [ Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 865, 875, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098 ; Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811-812, 122 P.2d 892 ; White Motor Corp. v. Teresinski (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 754, 761, 263 Cal. Rptr. 26 ]. Due process requirements were not satisfied in Aguilar v. Defendant Seller, when: a) defendant did not provide to plaintiff the evidence she requested of him [Attach 1, 2]; b) defendant seller 's and his counsel's perjured testimony was fed to the court [Attach.5]; c) the trial court does not answer plaintiff's questions, e.g., telling her "I [pro tem judge] don't repeat myself" when plaintiff asked what was the document the judge had just told defendant's counsel was missing, yet, when the opposite attorney or other lawyers ask questions the trial court politely answered to them; d) defense undermines plaintiff's case by misleading her with misinformation, e.g.: 1) telling the court that plaintiff's best precedent, Torelli v. J.P. Enterprises, was unpublished when it was well known that Torelli was published in 1998, causing more confusion and stress on plaintiff [see Attch 5]; 2) Mr. Jones telling plaintiff that the wrong document was missing when the pro tem judge would not repeat the information plaintiff requested (see item 'c' above); e) the trial court tells plaintiff "why are you looking at an 'old' motion for" when plaintiff tried to prove the defense's inconsistencies in its testimony and contradictions in its motions to the court [see Attch 6]; f) the trial court tells plaintiff not to speak unless she is told to, leaving her to say very little, but allowing opposing party to talk all he wants without interruptions, and when plaintiff tried to say something by saying, "if I may speak your honor ..." the judge pro tem snapped "you don't have to keep saying that"; g) and so it went, plaintiff's due process indeed. The issue above becomes one of law, which Plaintiff shall resolve in the proper district court. In City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 51, 64, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d522 the court ruled that when the issue is a question of law rather than one of fact the prior determination is not conclusive if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed. Further, the defense knew, or reasonably should have known that they arbitrarily, and deliberately, meshed in actions that deprived the plaintiff of her due process rights in violation of Rule 62(A) and Rule 63(A), and that they knowingly engaged in conduct to interfere with the plaintiff's due process.

E.

PUBLIC POLICY OF UNCLEAN HANDS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

Moreover, the Court's ruling must be based on its determination that the public policy of preventing fraud to perpetuate fraud, condoning perjured testimony, the braking of agreements at will, and discriminatory tactics, outweighed the public policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata, at least as applied on the facts of this case. The defense unlawfully obstructed plaintiff's access to evidence by telling her to go get the evidence herself from escrow (Attch. 4) when the defendant as a real estate broker knew he had to preserve copies of all documents in a transaction for three years from origination. Defendant Seller also unlawfully altered plaintiff purchase agreement by cutting her name and the commission clause from page eight, tampering with a binding document [Attach. 4] in an effort to destroy and conceal facts with potential evidentiary value in violation of Model Rule 3.4(a). Defendant Seller promise to give but never gave to plaintiff an offer he claimed to have from XXX Patel, yet showed up in court with a copy of page one of an old fainted doctored Offer, willfully suppressing evidence.

F.

FOR ISSUE PRECLUSION TO APPLY, THE ISSUE DECIDED IN THE PRIOR ADJUDICATION MUST BE "IDENTICAL" WITH THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN THE INSTANT ACTION

There are matters that were not adjudicated in the Aguilar v. Defendant Seller action much less decided by the court. The dominant issue in Aguilar v. Defendant Seller was defendant's "Breach"; that is, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith. But the dominant issues in Aguilar v. Defendant Buyer action are Damages for other issues as: discrimination, interference (by the Defendant Buyers, not by Defendant Seller), conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud (by Defendant Buyer). In Hollis v. Hollis , 650 So. 2d 1371, 1377 (Miss.1995) the court ruled that collateral estoppel only bars relitigation of issues that were actually decided in the prior action.

For issue preclusion to apply, the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the issue presented in the instant action [ Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal. 3d 903, 910, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920 ; Wimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Etc. Internat., Inc. (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1516, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612 ]. The doctrine of collateral estoppel depends on what issues were adjudicated, not the nature of the proceeding or the relief requested [ Lumpkin v. Jordan (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1231, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d303 ]. The issues must have been litigated and determined in the first action [Taylor v. Hawkinson (1957) 47 Cal. 2d 893, 895-896, 306 P.2d 797 (collateral estoppel not found); Nash v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 24 Cal. App. 4th 1793, 1812-1813, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454 (collateral estoppel not found); Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1010, 155 Cal. Rptr. 342 (collateral estoppel not found)].

No aspect of what was decided in the previous proceeding can be left to conjecture on the record, and if it is left to conjecture, estoppel is inapplicable [ Silver v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 338, 357, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 287 ; see Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 171, 181-182, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (it must appear precise question was raised and determined in former suit)]. In this action, the fraud claim could not even be mentioned according to trial judge pro tem, much less raised and determined rightfully by a jury (See Attch.10.) The trial court in the previous action mentions only: a) Breach of Contract, b) Interference (by Defendant Seller, not Defendant Buyer), c) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith ..., d) Fraud; the fraud claim was dismissed by the court under protest of Plaintiff. Plaintiff stated "may the record show that Plaintiff objects to the court's removal of Plaintiff's claim of fraud." At which time the court removed it and went on to say that Plaintiff had agreed. Plaintiff shall pursue this issue in the District Court at a later date.

1. In the Fifth Count plaintiff alleges the intentional infliction of emotional distress, not previously litigated. Unprivileged conduct that subjects another to economic ruin has been considered outrageous. Sanchez-Correa v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 908-909; cf. Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 67. In Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 872, 881-882, the court held that the defendant's intentional financial ruination of an apostate member constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendants intentionally led her to work on this transaction, at the exclusion of others, by making her believe that she would be compensated not only the 3% commission she had asked for but even increased her commission expectancy to 6%. But once defendants had acquired the benefit of plaintiff's real estate work, they not only terminated her services but worked behind her back to close the transaction she started. In the process, they subjected her to ill treatment, misrepresentations, and required her to perform several tasks they knew she was not going to be paid for. They then locked her out of the transaction by not being available when communications were indispensable and were extremely necessary when they knew time was of the essence. This destruction of plaintiff's livelihood through chicanery and deceit constitutes outrageous conduct and subjects defendant to liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

G.

RES JUDICATA IS INAPPROPRIATE AS A DEFENSE

AT THE DEMURRER STAGE

Res judicata is inappropriate as a defense at the demurrer stage since there are many undecided issues remaining that were never adjudicated, nor decided. Furthermore, many facts alleged herein above, justify setting the prior judgment, on the breach of contract action, aside [ Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 540, 554, 305 P.2d 20 ; Henry v. Clifford (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 315, 320, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116; Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 197 Cal. App. 3d 1292, 1299-1300, 243 Cal. Rptr. 390] due to defendant's perjured testimony, willful suppression of evidence, and his counsel's untruths [Attachs 1, 2, 5.]

CONCLUSION

There are genuine issues of material facts not adjudicated in the prior proceedings, hence, the court must rule in favor of plaintiff, and promptly schedule a jury trial.

Dated: April 9, 2001 Respectfully submitted, By: Teresa Aguilar, Plaintiff pro se


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CASE NO: BC268016

OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF TO DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT

DEFENDANT ESCROW

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Plaintiff TERESA AGUILAR hereby answers and opposes defendant DEFENDANT ESCROW, and/or all other defendants, et al., demurrer(s) to plaintiff's complaint. This action is essentially for damages of conspiracy, discrimination, interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, retaliation, and fraud case. Plaintiff's complaint entails matters to be decided by a resolution of the factual issues involved — and thus improper to resolve on demurrer.

Dated: April 8, 2002 By: Teresa Aguilar, Plaintiff pro se Plaintiff pro se

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRERS

I. INTRODUCTION

The complaint alleges that plaintiff Teresa Aguilar, a real estate broker, and plaintiff pro se seeking to redress her grievance, not in a vexatious manner but in a plea seeking to hold defendants accountable for their fraudulent conduct, suffered damages as a result of the defendants' wrongdoing acting in concert against plaintiff, and who used her real estate services to their benefit and did not compensate plaintiff as promised by Defendant Seller even after they constantly encouraged her to continue with her efforts while the defendants colluded to finalize the transaction behind her back. After plaintiff complied with defendants' demands, she was never paid the commission promised, and Defendant Escrow knew of the existence of the agreement between defendant seller and Plaintiff, yet wrongfully opted to conspire to deprive plaintiff of the commission by negligently releasing all the proceeds to Defendant Seller who had Wang absconded with the proceeds to Taiwan.

On March 25, 2002, defendant Defendant Escrow demurred to Plaintiff complaint on grounds alleging that plaintiff does not state a cause of action.

A hearing has been set for May 2, 2002 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 44 of this Court, at the Los Angeles County Courthouse, located at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012. Plaintiff ask the court to join defendant's Defendant Seller hearing date of April 17, 2002 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 44 of this Court, to the May 2, 2002 date.

That plaintiff pro se may write a complaint in the wrong format does not mean that her causes of action evaporate at the will of defendant. The facts are clear, and the defendants' state of mind palpable; their assertions of no wrongdoing shows that they do not recognize their offenses, may not correct their misconduct, and will continue to defraud the unsuspected public.

II. ARGUMENT

1.

DEFENDANT ESCROW HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT TO PAY A BROKER'S FEE, AND SHOULD HAVE HELD ONTO THE MONEY BECAUSE IT HAD A "DUTY" TO DO SO.

As asserted by Defendant Escrow (see Defendant Escrow Demurrer to Complaint dated 3/25/02, Page 1, Paragraph 2, Lines 24,25) it had knowledge of the existence of the contract between defendant seller and Plaintiff in which Defendant Escrow was timely notified of defendant Defendant Seller's agreement to pay plaintiff the 6% commission, yet, Defendant Escrow decided not to pay any of the commission to plaintiff as the broker; therefore, plaintiff must be awarded damages pled, for Defendant Escrow's intentional interference with Plaintiff's contractual right to her commission. [145 Cal.App.3d 1002] conspiring with the other defendants to deprive plaintiff of her earnings by not holding amount due to her and releasing the entire funds to Defendant Seller who entrusted the assets to Wang who absconded to Taiwan. In Routh v. Quinn (1942) 20 Cal.2d 488 [127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215 the court held "We can conceive of no requirement that, to afford an assignee the right to recover assigned funds, held in escrow, the escrow holder must owe to the assignee some "legal duty" or have entered into a contract with the assignee."

It would be a terrible precedent if sellers could cancel their agreements to third parties at will. Defendant Escrow should have held onto the money because it had a "duty" to [CONTEMPORARY INVESTMENTS, INC. v. SAFECO TITLE INS. CO. , 145 Cal.App.3d 1003] do so. Thus, Defendant Escrow should not have released the funds to the sellers because Defendant Escrow had clear knowledge of the existence of the agreement providing to pay a broker's fee to Plaintiff.

2.

DEFENDANT ESCROW INTERFERED WITH THE CONTRACT BY RELEASING THE FUNDS.

In Contemporary Investments, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. , 145 Cal.App.3d 999, the trial court found Safeco interfered with the contract by releasing the funds. In this action, Plaintiff asserts her claim that Defendant Escrow had no duty to obey defendant seller reneging and canceling payment of the commission he promised in writing to plaintiff. Civil Conspiracy and Interference with Contractual Relations, 8 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 302, 308, n.28 (1975). Defendant Seller even increase commission payment from 3% to 6% of purchase price, evidencing his satisfaction with plaintiff's real estate services.

The elements of a cause of action for inducing breach of contract 'are: (1) that a valid contract existed between the plaintiff and another party; (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the contract and intended to induce a breach thereof; (3) that the contract was breached, (4) as a proximate result of the defendant's wrongful or unjustified conduct, (5) resulting in damage to the plaintiff.'" (Mayes v. Sturdy Northern Sales, Inc. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 69, 78 [154 Cal.Rptr. 43].) (1) Defendant Escrow knew of the valid agreement existed between plaintiff and Defendant Seller; (2) Defendant Escrow had knowledge of the contract and the discovery face will show its involvement in this action; (3) the contract was breached by Defendant Seller; (4) as a result of Defendant Escrow not holding the amount of the commission due to Plaintiff; (5) resulting in damages to plaintiff.

In Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963), the Wise court did hold that a party to a contract could be held liable for a civil conspiracy to interfere (tortuously) with [a] ... contract.

3

DEFENDANT ESCROW HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGREEMENT,

INTERFERED WITH THE COMPLIANCE OF THE AGREEMENT BY

NOT HOLDING THE COMMISSION DUE TO PLAINTIFF,

By Defendant Escrow's own words, Plaintiff has met her burden of proof on the issue that Defendant Escrow had knowledge of the agreement of Defendant Seller to promise to pay plaintiff, interfered with the compliance of the agreement by not holding the commission due to plaintiff.

In Ogdahl v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d Supp. 41 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 148, the court cites the rule that when the escrow agent has been notified the proceeds of sale have been assigned to a third party, he must pay the funds despite the attempts of the assignor to cancel. Builders' Control Service of No. Cal., Inc. v. North American Title Guar. Co. (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 68, 70 [22 Cal.Rptr. 712] is given as authority. In Builders', the complaint alleged a third party had assigned the sale proceeds to Builders'. The title company acted as escrow agent for the assigned funds but refused to pay the funds to Builders'. The court also noted: "[O]nce ... the escrow holder [is] notified of the assignment, the escrow holder must observe such assignment, even though the assignor should give it contrary instructions." (Id, at p. 73.)

In Feinberg v .Intrastate escrow Corp. (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 80, 82-84 the court held that a plaintiff, who was the third party beneficiary of an escrow that was secretly canceled, was entitled to recover against the escrow holder under estoppel principles. Thus, it should follow that a third party beneficiary of an escrow that was secretly wrapped up and consummated, should also be entitled to recover against the escrow holder under estoppel principles.

As stated above, Defendant Escrow, the escrow holder had notice that [215 Cal.App.2d 682] defendant seller had promised in writing to pay plaintiff the 6% commission. It is the duty of an escrow holder to exercise ordinary skill and diligence (Amen v. Merced County Title Co., supra, 58 Cal.2d 528, 532; Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar. Co., supra, 35 Cal.2d 170, 173), and if escrow acts negligently it is responsible for any loss occasioned thereby, [215 Cal.App.2d 683]. (Amen v. Merced County Title Co., supra, 58 Cal.2d 528, 532; Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar. Co., supra, 35 Cal.2d 170, 173; Karras v. Title Ins. & Guar. Co., supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 659, 665.)

Whether this conduct, under all of the circumstances, amounts to a failure of the escrow holder to exercise ordinary skill and diligence that constitutes negligence, [215 Cal.App.2d 684] is a question of fact for determination by a jury.

Ordinarily the issue of damages in negligence actions present questions of fact (Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30, 37 [286 P.2d 21]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310, 319 [282 P.2d 12]); the state of the evidence in the instant case does not justify a determination thereof as a matter of law; and defendant escrow holder's contention to the contrary would be without merit.

4.

WHEN THE ESCROW AGENT IS NOTIFIED THAT

THE PROCEEDS OF SALE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO

A THIRD PARTY, ESCROW IS REQUIRED TO DISBURSE FUNDS

"... the [escrow] agent is required to disburse funds to [a] creditor even though the party to the escrow attempts to cancel the agent's authority." (2 Miller & Starr, The Current Law of Cal. Real Estate (1968 ed.) Ownership, § 285, p. 361; e.g., Warrington Lbr. Co. v. Fullerton Mtge. & escrow Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 706, 711 [35 Cal.Rptr. 423].) The same basic rule applies when the escrow agent is notified that the proceeds of sale had been assigned to a third party. (See Builders' Control Service of No. Cal., Inc. v. North American Title Guar. Co. (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 68, 70 [22 Cal.Rptr. 712].) Discovery will show the motive behind escrow wrongful actions of releasing all proceeds without withholding Plaintiff commission when notified of the existence of an agreement for Plaintiff to be paid

CONCLUSION

The transaction involved here is not an uncommon one; it constituted an agreement to a commission payment. One should find no reason in the decisions or in commercial practice why such an assignment should not be recognized by an escrow holder who has received notice of it. [BUILDERS' CONTROL SERVICE OF NO. CAL., INC. v. NORTH AMERICAN TITLE GUAR. CO., First Dist., Div. One. 1962 205 Cal.App.2d 68.]

Plaintiff's complaint entails matters to be decided by a resolution of the factual issues involved -- and thus improper to resolve on demurrer. Furthermore, there are genuine issues of material facts not adjudicated in the prior proceedings, hence, the court must rule in favor of plaintiff, and promptly schedule a jury trial.

Dated: April 9, 2001 Respectfully submitted, By: Teresa Aguilar, Plaintiff pro se